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NO NEED FOR CITIES TO DESPAIR AFTER BANK OF 
AMERICA CORPORATION V. CITY OF MIAMI:  HOW 
PATENT LAW CAN ASSIST IN PROVING 
PREDATORY LOANS DIRECTLY CAUSE 




Lack of sanguinity for cities was manifest after the Supreme Court’s May 1, 
2017, opinion in Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami. Although Bank of 
America recognized that cities have Article III standing to sue for economic injuries 
suffered from predatory lending, the Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s 
more lenient causation standard, favoring proof of “some direct relation between the 
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Doubtless the result could have 
been worse for cities suing on the premise that racially discriminatory lending caused 
municipal blight. The courthouse doors could have closed if the Court had declined 
to recognize Miami’s standing to bring a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act. Yet
the visceral reaction to the approbated standard is that cities face a daunting task to 
prove causation. This paper argues that patent law can inform analysis on and 
demonstrate how cities can prove causation between discriminatory lending 
practices and the blighted atmospherics of depressed housing. In three parts, the 
paper provides an overview of the Fair Housing Act, reviews Bank of America, and 
discusses how patent law can assist in proving whether predatory lending causes a
city’s economic harm. Patent law offers experts versed in detecting what attribute 
drives consumer decisions. Although loss of tax revenue from economic blight is 
fraught with complexity, economists have the tools in a proper adversarial system to 
present competing views on what caused a city’s downturn. Upon presentation of 
admissible evidence, whether the banks or cities prevail should turn on a jury’s 
decision about whether racially motivated predation proximately caused a city—and 
indirectly its residents—to suffer financial calamity.
I. INTRODUCTION
“[L]ittle doubt” of failure on remand, reflected Justice Clarence Thomas, with 
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whom Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined.1 “[A] tough 
test” on which to prevail, suggested Lyle Denniston, the National Constitution 
Center’s correspondent for the Supreme Court.2 Not “a complete loss,” reported 
Adam Liptak of The New York Times.3 “A mixed-bag ruling,” remarked Tony 
Mauro in The National Law Journal.4 Portents “seriously undermine the ostensible 
liberal victory,” offered Steven Mazie of The Economist.5 “[A] real body blow 
against fair housing in America,” lamented Mark Joseph Stern of Slate.6 Although 
not all commentary presented a dystopian spiral away from the core tenets of the Fair 
Housing Act,7 lack of sanguinity for cities was manifest after the Supreme Court’s 
May 1, 2017, opinion in Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami.
Although Bank of America recognized that cities have Article III standing to sue 
for economic injuries suffered from predatory lending,8 the Supreme Court rejected 
the Eleventh Circuit’s more lenient causation standard, favoring proof of “some 
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”9
Doubtless the result could have been worse for cities suing on the premise that 
racially discriminatory lending caused municipal blight.  The courthouse doors could 
have closed if the Court had declined to recognize Miami’s standing to bring a 
lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act.10 Yet the visceral reaction to the approbated 
standard is that cities face a daunting task to prove causation.11 For cities to pick up 
and move on, they need a pathway forward.  To borrow logic from another area of 
the law, surely if a right to bring a lawsuit exists, necessarily a way must exist to 
                                                                                                     
1 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1311 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2 Lyle Denniston, Cities Get Limited Right to Sue for Race Bias in Housing, NAT'L CONST. CTR. (May 
1, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/cities-get-limited-right-to-sue-for-race-bias-in-housing 
[https://perma.cc/ZU9G-62H5].





4 Tony Mauro, SCOTUS Decision May Fuel Suits Against Banks, THE NAT'L L.J. (May 1, 2017), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202784977615/SCOTUS-Decision-May-Fuel-Suits-Against-
Banks?mcode=1202615705846 [https://perma.cc/X8F7-Q38W]. 
5 Steven Mazie, The Supreme Court Says Cities May Sue Banks Over Predatory Lending, THE
ECONOMIST (May 2, 2017), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/05/so-sue-them 
[https://perma.cc/FUL6-F9TN].
6 Mark Joseph Stern, Will Fair Housing Stay Fair?, SLATE (May 1, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/05/In_Bank_of_America_v_Miami
_the_Supreme_Court_Strengthens_The_Fair_Housing.html [https://perma.cc/93PJ-EKJE].
7 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, An Important Victory for Civil Rights, ACS BLOG (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/an-important-victory-for-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/A3GH-UST9].
8 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017) (“The upshot is that the City 
alleges economic injuries that arguably fall within the FHA’s zone of interests, as we have previously 
interpreted that statute.”). 
9 Id. at 1305 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’rs Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
10 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“We think the Court of Appeals failed 
to apply the foregoing principles in denying the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment.  Respondents 
had not made the requisite demonstration of (at least) injury and redressability.”).
11 Denniston, supra note 2.
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prosecute and prove the case.12
As unlikely a savior as there ever was, precepts from patent law may invigorate 
the plight of cities to curb predatory lending.  Decisional law requires experts opining 
on damages in patent cases to attribute economic losses to the patented invention 
alone, compelling isolation of and evidence demonstrating the worth of the 
infringing portion of the product.13 Those experts are deft at discerning whether an 
infringing component “drives” the purchasing decisions of the product, enabling 
under certain circumstances compensation for the entire market value of that 
product.14 If experts can present competing theories on whether a component is the 
cause of a price point for a product, so too can experts opine on whether a direct 
relation exists between predatory lending and the manifestations of dilapidation and 
decreased tax revenue.       
This paper argues that patent law can inform analysis on and demonstrate how 
cities can prove causation between discriminatory lending practices and the blighted 
atmospherics of depressed housing.  In three parts, the paper provides an overview 
of the Fair Housing Act, reviews Bank of America, and discusses how patent law can 
assist in proving whether predatory lending causes a city’s economic harm.  All is 
not forlorn for cities seeking relief from lending practices that discriminate among 
loan applicants. The auspice of a more exacting causation standard does not doom 
these lawsuits; it forces cities early on to perform the economic analysis necessary 
to prove actual damages.  Patent law offers experts versed in detecting what attribute 
drives consumer decisions.  Although loss of tax revenue from economic blight is 
fraught with complexity, economists have the tools in a proper adversarial system to 
present competing views on what caused a city’s downturn.  Upon presentation of 
admissible evidence, whether the banks or cities prevail should turn on a jury’s 
decision about whether racially motivated predation proximately caused a city—and 
indirectly its residents—to suffer financial calamity.  
II. RACIAL SEGREGATION AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
THROUGH OCTOBER TERM 2014
The Supreme Court concluded that de jure racial segregation is unconstitutional 
roughly one century ago, “but its vestiges remain today, intertwined with the 
country’s economic and social life.”15 To appreciate the Fair Housing Act is to 
appreciate its origins and its ascension.
                                                                                                     
12 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732-33 (2015) (“Our decisions in this area have been animated 
in part by the recognition that because it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional, ‘[i]t necessarily 
follows that there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.’” (citation omitted)).   
13 Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (“Under § 284, damages awarded for patent infringement ‘must reflect the value attributable to the 
infringing features of the product, and no more.’” (citation omitted)).   
14 See id. at 1302 (“Under the entire market value rule, if a party can prove that the patented invention 
drives demand for the accused end product, it can rely on the end product’s entire market value as the 
royalty base.”).
15 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2515 
(2015).
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A.  The Fair Housing Act: Acknowledgement that Fairness in Housing Is Inviolable
As the twentieth century matured, society witnessed the parallel advent of rapid 
urbanization alongside suburban growth.16 The upshot was the flight of many whites 
to suburbs, leaving less mobile minorities in urban areas.17 As the Supreme Court 
explained in 2015, racial discrimination in lending practices became commonplace:
During this time, various practices were followed, sometimes with governmental 
support, to encourage and maintain the separation of the races: Racially restrictive 
covenants prevented the conveyance of property to minorities; steering by real-
estate agents led potential buyers to consider homes in racially homogenous areas;
and discriminatory lending practices, often referred to as redlining, precluded 
minority families from purchasing homes in affluent areas.18
By the 1960s, the footprint of those practices and prejudices festered, creating 
“predominantly black inner cities surrounded by mostly white suburbs.”19
In response to the yawning separation among races, “President Lyndon Johnson 
established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly 
known as the Kerner Commission.”20 In 1968, after cataloging massive amounts of 
information, the Kerner Commission found “residential segregation and unequal 
housing and economic conditions in the inner cities as significant, underlying causes 
of the social unrest.”21 Despite Brown v. Board of Education,22 the Kerner 
Commission presented the dire circumstances of a country “moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”23 The Kerner Commission 
detailed that “[n]early two-thirds of nonwhite families living in cities had to endure 
substandard housing and general urban blight” while “open and covert racial 
discrimination” hindered their mobility.24 To guard against the slide into de facto 
segregation, the Kerner Commission recommended “a comprehensive and 
enforceable open-occupancy law making it an offense to discriminate in the sale or 
rental of any housing . . . on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.”25 In 
April 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, 
hastening resolve to alleviate social unrest.26
Responding the same month as Dr. King’s assassination, Congress passed the 
Fair Housing Act as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, proscribing the denial of 
housing opportunities on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin.”27 In 
                                                                                                     
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 Id. (citation omitted).  
19 Id.
20 Id. at 2516 (citation omitted).  
21 Id. (citation omitted).  
22 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“We come then to the question presented:  Does 
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities 
and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities?  We believe that it does.”).
23 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2516 (citation omitted).
24 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
25 Id. (citation omitted).  
26 Id. (citation omitted).  
27 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 804. 
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1988, Congress amended the Fair Housing Act, establishing, among other things, 
certain exemptions from liability as well as “familial status” as a protected 
characteristic.28
The Fair Housing Act allows an “aggrieved person” to file a civil cause of action 
seeking damages for a violation of the statute.29 An “aggrieved person” includes 
“any person who . . . claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing 
practice.”30 It forbids “discriminat[ing] against any person in the terms, conditions, 
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 
in connection therewith, because of race.”31 And it makes unlawful “any person or 
other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related 
transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a 
transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race.”32 In 
a different context, Justice Kennedy reflected that “[t]his Nation has a moral and 
ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society 
that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”33
As retold by the Constitutional Accountability Center, when the Fair Housing 
Act was first proposed in 1968, provisions deputized the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development to enforce the law directly by, for example, ordering landlords 
to cease and desist their discriminatory practices or face sanctions.34 Although the 
legislative process eliminated that type of enforcement oversight, the drafters 
broadened the definition of “aggrieved person” to include as many plaintiffs as 
possible.35
In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., 
writing for the Court in a 7-2 opinion released in 1979, exposited that plaintiffs under 
the Fair Housing Act have standing to sue “as broad[] as is permitted by Article 
III.”36 On allegations that a village had suffered injury from racially motivated 
manipulations to the housing market, which denied certain minorities their choice in 
housing based on race,37 the Court made unequivocal “that the facts alleged in the 
complaints and revealed by initial discovery are sufficient to provide standing.”38
According to Justice Powell, “[a] significant reduction in property values directly 
injures a municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability to bear 
the costs of local government and to provide services.”39 The Court observed that 
                                                                                                     
28 Id. (citation omitted).  
29 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A), (c)(1) (2012).
30 Id. § 3602(i).
31 Id. § 3604(b).
32 Id. § 3605(a).
33 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).
34 Stern, supra note 6.
35 Id.
36 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
37 Id. at 95. (“The complaints further alleged that the ‘Village of Bellwood . . . has been injured by 
having [its] housing market . . . wrongfully and illegally manipulated to the economic and social detriment 
of the citizens of [the] village,’ and that the individual respondents ‘have been denied their right to select 
housing without regard to race and have been deprived of the social and professional benefits of living in 
an integrated society.’”).
38 Id. at 115.
39 Id. at 110-11.
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“[o]ther harms flowing from the realities of a racially segregated community are not 
unlikely.”40 Gladstone thus enabled villages to sue for injuries from racial-steering 
practices.41
B.  Disparate Impact and the Maturing Views of the Fair Housing Act
Twenty-five years after Gladstone, in Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, the Supreme Court granted 
a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to 
address whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act.42 The Court had concluded in the employment-law context that plaintiffs could 
sue under Title VII on the theory that practices “fair in form” could still discriminate 
“in operation.”43 According to the Court, “the consequences of employment 
practices, not simply the motivation,” create a claim for relief from the practices’ 
disparate impact on the workplace environment.44 Disparate-impact claims, the 
Court explained, further the “goal of achieving ‘equality of employment 
opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past’ to favor some 
races over others.”45
By the time the Court granted certiorari in 2014, eleven federal appeals courts 
had addressed whether the disparate-impact reasoning of Title VII applied in the Fair 
Housing Act context—all of which recognized such a claim in some form.46 Among 
the amicus briefs filed on the merits, nearly two dozen advocated for the claim, while 
fifteen were opposed.47 As reported by Amy Howe of the inimitable SCOTUSblog,
the prospect of the Court eliminating that theory of liability under the Fair Housing 
Act precipitated two previous settlements before a final decision: 
Civil rights groups were so nervous about the prospect that the Roberts court might 
eliminate disparate-impact suits that two earlier cases were settled before the justices 
could rule on the merits, but in the end Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the court’s 
four more liberal justices to uphold disparate-impact suits, at least in some 
circumstances.48
The Court held oral argument in January 2015, revealing strident views among 
a divided bench.49 Justice Antonin Scalia seemingly favored the plaintiffs: “You 
                                                                                                     
40 Id. at 111.
41 Id. 
42 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (“Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.”).
43 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
44 Id. at 432 (emphasis omitted).
45 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2517 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30).  
46 Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: That Housing Bias Issue Is Back, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 20, 
2015, 5:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/argument-preview-that-housing-bias-issue-is-
back/ [https://perma.cc/X6B9-B2HL].
47 Id.
48 Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Justices to Consider Scope of Fair Housing Act, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Nov. 3, 2016, 10:03 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-
scope-of-fair-housing-act/ [https://perma.cc/ZK4D-NRPE].
49 Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Scalia Versus Scalia on Housing Law?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 
21, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/argument-analysis-scalia-versus-scalia-on-
housing-law/ [https://perma.cc/U83F-STSK].
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have to look at the whole law, and, when all parts are read together, there is such a 
thing as ‘disparate impact.’  You don’t look at each little piece, you look at the whole 
law.”50 He then shifted, joining Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. in questioning 
how local-housing authorities could be expected to deal with disparate-impact claims 
as they build separate housing in poor areas and affluent neighborhoods.51 When the 
federal government pressed an expansive view of what constitutes disparate impact, 
Justice Kennedy characterized the breadth of the position as “very odd.”52 Justice 
Steven G. Breyer, consistent with three of his colleagues, reflected that if these 
lawsuits have been “helpful to many people,” and if “as far as I can tell, the world 
hasn’t come to an end” in the years since their recognition, why should the Court 
reverse course now?53
In June 2015, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in a 5-4 opinion, made 
clear that “disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.”54
Justice Kennedy cautioned that “a disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical 
disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies 
causing that disparity.”55 The Court, in the end, endorsed a “robust causality 
requirement” to prevent “defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they 
did not create.”56 Justice Alito dissented, with whom Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined.57 Justice Alito argued that disparate-impact 
claims hamper “good-faith attempt[s] to ensure minimally acceptable housing for its 
poorest residents.”58 Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent, questioning the validity 
of disparate-impact claims in any context for which it is not expressly provided in 
the statute.59
In view of the Court’s skepticism of statistics, coupled with a rigorous causation 
standard, many commentators concluded that the plaintiff’s victory “was by no 
means an unqualified one” and would be challenging on remand.60 The Fifth Circuit 
remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas,61 and 
District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater of the Dallas Division proved those commentators 
correct when he dismissed the case on grounds that the plaintiff had “failed to prove 
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a challenged practice caused a 
                                                                                                     
50 Id.  
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Amy Howe, Justice Scalia Keeps Both Sides Guessing in Fair Housing Act Case: In Plain
English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2015, 12:18PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/justice-scalia-
keeps-both-sides-guessing-in-fair-housing-act-case-in-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/MM7A-PPLD].
54 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 
(2015).  
55 Id. at 2523.  
56 Id.   
57 Id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 2532.
59 Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60 Amy Howe, Disparate-Impact Claims Survive Challenge: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 
25, 2015, 12:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/disparate-impact-claims-survive-challenge-in-
plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/8CQX-F6DP].
61 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 795 F.3d 509, 510 (5th Cir. 
2015) (“Accordingly, we now remand this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Texas for further proceedings consistent with our opinion and the opinion of the Supreme Court.”).
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discriminatory effect.”62 While Texas Department of Housing broadened the types 
of claims actionable under the Fair Housing Act, the case did not address the types 
of plaintiffs who could sue on those claims.  
III. BANK OF AMERICA AND CITY STANDING UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Amid the mortgage-backed housing crisis between 2004 and 2012, cities began 
to explore possible relief from diminished property-tax revenue and burgeoning 
blight.63 Local governmental entities crisscrossing the country—from Rhode Island 
to Maryland to Georgia to Florida to California—tested a novel legal theory under 
the Fair Housing Act for combating predatory loans.64 Just as Texas Department of 
Housing solved one issue, the debate shifted from what could be claimed to who
could bring the claim.  For two cities, that legal theory netted seven-figure 
settlements with banking institutions, amplifying the implications of these lawsuits.65
To understand the extant plight between cities and banks requires understanding how 
cities came to view urban blight and how the Court’s opinion in Bank of America has 
shaped expectations.
A.  The Genesis of City Lawsuits Under the Fair Housing Act
Cities like Miami faced a moment of reckoning as they watched the progression 
of municipal blight infect their neighborhoods.66 Amy Howe put it this way:
It sounds like a scene from “The Wire,” but with palm trees and swimming pools: 
Gangs run prostitution rings and criminals hide dead bodies in vacant houses.  The 
illegal activities spill over into the rest of the neighborhood, leading to an overall 
increase in violent crime and stretching police officers and firefighters thin.  
                                                                                                     
62 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114562, at *43 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016).   
63 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Says Cities Can Sue Big Banks Over Housing Bubble Damages,
THE WASH. POST (May 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/cities-may-sue-
big-banks-over-predatory-lending-damage-supreme-court-rules/2017/05/01/cf8c108a-2e79-11e7-9534-
00e4656c22aa_story.html?utm_term=.87352122d87c [https://perma.cc/FVG4-3HPB].  According to 
Barnes:
“Municipal suits like this one were unheard of until recently, when enterprising 
contingency-fee counsel began pushing them,” Bank of America told the court in 
its brief.  Baltimore settled a suit it had filed against banks, and there is litigation 
underway by Cook County, Ill., Oakland, Calif., Los Angeles and other cities.
64 See id.; Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Orders New Look at Bias Lawsuits Against Banks,
BLOOMBERGPOLITICS (May 1, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-01/top-u-s-
court-orders-new-look-at-bias-lawsuits-against-banks [https://perma.cc/R73G-JKP2] (“Similar suits have 
been filed around the country, including claims by Los Angeles and three Georgia counties.”); Liz Farmer, 
Why Few Cities Will Take the Supreme Court Up on Their Right to Sue Banks, GOVERNING (May 11, 
2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-cities-banks-miami-supreme-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/572F-T9A2] (“There are, however, a number of open cases in places like Los Angeles; 
Oakland, Calif.; and Providence, R.I., that benefit from the ruling.”).
65 Kenneth Jost, Banks May Pay for Ravaging Minority Neighborhoods, JOST ON JUSTICE (May 7, 
2017), http://jostonjustice.blogspot.com/2017/05/banks-may-pay-for-ravaging-minority.html 
[https://perma.cc/RH2S-NFVY]. 
66 Howe, supra note 48.
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Property values plummet, creating a vicious circle:  Cities have fewer resources to 
combat these crimes, at the exact time when they need more.67
The Miami Fraternal Order of the Police described a macabre outlook.68
Foreclosed homes became places to hide dead bodies and facilitate child-sex 
trafficking.69 Abandoned swimming pools became sites for deaths from drowning.70
Those untended pools, moreover, became breeding grounds for swarms of 
mosquitos, creating “the epicenter for America’s first Zika outbreak.”71
Miami, and others, decided to resist the butterfly-effect belief that global market 
downturns and other distant influences had localized effects on their residents, 
resolving to explore pernicious causal agents more close to home.72 Miami came to 
believe that its problems were rooted in banks like Wells Fargo and Bank of America, 
deducing that those lending entities were discriminating against African-Americans 
and Latinos when issuing them mortgages by making predatory loans that were more 
likely to lead to foreclosures.73
In 2013, Miami filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida against several banks, alleging Fair Housing Act violations premised on 
the notion “that[] since 2004, Defendants have engaged in a continuing and unbroken 
pattern and practice of mortgage discrimination in Miami that still exists today.”74
Among the counsel representing Miami were Robert S. Peck, President of the Center 
for Constitutional Litigation, and Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean and Raymond Pryke 
Professor of First Amendment Law at the University of California, Irvine School of 
Law.75 The banks enlisted assistance from Goodwin Procter LLP.76
The complaint, comprising sixty-three pages, alleged that the banks steered 
undesirable mortgage loans to African-American and Latino borrowers and refused 
to refinance them on terms that were available to white borrowers.77 According to 
the complaint, a regression analysis of available data demonstrated that an African-
American borrower was 4.321 times more likely to receive a discriminatory loan 
than a white borrower with similar underwriting and borrower characteristics.78 And 
a Latino borrower was 1.576 times more likely to receive such loans.79 The 
allegations reference statements from bank employees, which confirm the practice 
of directing undesirable loans to minority borrowers.80 As foreclosures occurred 
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against minority borrowers, the banks purportedly refused to offer refinancing to 
minorities on terms available to white borrowers.81 An African-American borrower 
was 13.324 times more likely to experience foreclosure than a white borrower with 
similar risk characteristics; a Latino borrower was 17.341 times more likely to 
experience foreclosure than a white borrower with similar risk characteristics.82
Miami also alleged that a minority-neighborhood borrower was 5.857 times more 
likely to experience foreclosure than a borrower in a non-minority neighborhood.83
Miami’s injuries from the supposed predatory loans resulted in tax-revenue losses, 
costs attendant to abandoned houses, and frustration of its goal of ending racial 
segregation in housing.84
In 2014, District Judge William P. Dimitrouleas of the Fort Lauderdale Division 
dismissed the lawsuit on grounds that Miami did not have standing to sue and could 
not allege facts in support of causation.85 The district court denied Miami’s motions 
for reconsideration of that order and for leave to file an amended complaint,86
reasoning that a generalized interest in curbing segregation is not enough to fortify 
standing under the Fair Housing Act:
[S]prinkling in allegations that the City has a generalized interest in racial 
integration falls far short of alleging facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants’ 
lending practices adversely affected the racial diversity or integration of the City, 
nor do those generalized allegations appear to be connected in any meaningful way 
to the purported loss of tax revenue and increase in municipal expenses allegedly 
caused by Defendants’ lending practices.87
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded.88
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Stanley Marcus expressed skepticism over the 
merits of the lawsuit, but nonetheless remanded because of the district court’s errors 
on standing and proximate cause.89 According to the Eleventh Circuit, Miami had 
alleged sufficient injuries to bring a lawsuit and need only show that its injuries were 
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foreseeable from the alleged lending practices.90
The banks filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted 
to the Eleventh Circuit in June 2016.91 The Court granted the petition several months 
after the death of Justice Scalia, garnering at least four votes from the remaining 
eight justices.92 The questions presented involved whether cities have standing to 
sue and whether Miami suffered injuries proximately caused by a violation of the 
Fair Housing Act.93 In October 2016, the Court granted the federal government’s 
motion for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae.94        
In advance of oral argument, both sides took understandably differing views on 
the issues before the Court.95 The banks asserted that Miami does not have standing 
under the Fair Housing Act because its injury stems from purported discrimination 
against someone else.96 Anyone could make a similar claim if Miami has standing, 
the banks warned, “from homeowners whose property values are reduced by the 
vacant houses next door to store owners who lose sales because there are fewer 
residents to buy their wares.”97 The banks also inveighed against Miami’s 
proximate-cause theory, suggesting the existence of many other causes “ranging 
from a global recession to a divorce.”98 The banks cautioned that if Miami’s claims 
are not restrained, “liability would extend to all remote-if-unremarkable 
consequences, stretching as far as the imagination.”99 Miami countered that 
Congress envisioned the Fair Housing Act as occupying “unique and enormous 
breadth” for the purpose of providing “fair housing throughout the United States.”100
When they made predatory loans, Miami argued, the banks no doubt anticipated the 
undesirable outcomes that followed.101 Miami exhorted that cities play a salient role 
in fighting housing discrimination because “cities are where the impact of that 
discrimination ‘is most acutely felt.’”102 Allowing cities to sue, Miami explained, 
“will not lead to lawsuits by private entities like dry cleaners or butchers . . . .  ‘[O]nly 
parties with an interest in fair housing—like cities—can sue under the FHA.’”103
Miami also reassured that, although a stiff causation standard is inconsistent with the 
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statute, its statistical analysis to isolate other possible causes will satisfy scrutiny 
under any standard.104
The case garnered the attention of two amici with outsized influence in terms of 
overall filings and persuasive ability.105 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed an 
amicus brief in support of the banks, arguing that remote-economic-harm exposure 
could subject “lending institutions and potentially many other business entities, to 
virtually boundless liability.”106 The federal government filed an amicus brief in 
support of Miami, maintaining that efforts to achieve the purposes of the Fair 
Housing Act depend “heavily on enforcement by persons who are not direct victims 
of discrimination.”107 The federal government observed that direct victims 
“frequently do not know that they have been subjected to discrimination, let alone 
have the means to change it.”108
The Court held oral argument in November 2016, with some cognoscenti 
suggesting a divided 4-4 tie in the offing.109 On behalf of the banks, former Acting 
Solicitor General Neal Katyal argued that, although some scenarios may exist in 
which a city could sue, Miami is seeking to impose a “six-step liability”110 theory 
both unrelated to and “several steps removed” from the discriminatory conduct that 
the city alleges.111 Katyal encountered resistance from several justices, including 
Justice Elena Kagan.112 She posited that, for reverse redlining—the practice of 
charging non-white customers more for their loans than their white counterparts—
“who better than the city to recognize that interest and assert it.”113 “Everything 
about this complaint,” Justice Kagan reminded, “is about segregation.”114
Robert Peck, on behalf of Miami, stressed that the banks’ loans “actually 
frustrated and counteracted the city’s efforts on fair housing,” causing the city “to 
lose the benefits of social, professional, and business opportunities that come with 
an integrated community free from housing discrimination.”115 Chief Justice Roberts 
appeared to disagree: “I understand your argument that you’re down the line, but I 
don’t see how you can say that your loss of property taxes is a direct injury.”116
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Justice Kennedy also appeared skeptical: “The statute doesn’t prohibit decreasing 
property tax values.”117 Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy expressed 
concern over a limiting principle for damages if the city is allowed to recover.118
Justice Breyer rejoined that the Court need not decide the issue of damages to resolve 
the current dispute.119 Yet disquiet remained over opening the courthouse doors to 
a stampede of lawsuits with unbridled claims.  “How do we write it,” Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor asked Curtis Gannon, who argued on behalf of the federal government, 
so that the city can bring its lawsuit but the corner store that lost business due to the 
foreclosure crisis cannot?120 In the intervening five months between oral argument 
and public release, the Court settled on how to write the opinion and also gained a 
colleague (Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, who did not participate in deciding the case).121
B. Bank of America:  The Twin Sanctions of City Standing Under the Fair 
Housing Act and Direct-Relation Causation
In May 2017, Justice Breyer (with whom Chief Justice Roberts alongside 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined) authored the Court’s 
opinion, recognizing that Miami has constitutional standing to bring a lawsuit under 
the Fair Housing Act, while vacating and remanding on the issue of causation.122
Writing for the 5-3 majority, Justice Breyer rejected the argument that Miami was 
not injured, concluding that the banks’ alleged discrimination implicated widespread 
foreclosures and vacancies in the city’s minority communities, which decreased the 
value of the foreclosed homes and affected neighborhoods.123 The decline in 
property values, the Court observed, decreased property-tax revenues, forcing the 
city to spend more on municipal services to remedy blight and unsafe conditions.124
The banks’ alleged discrimination, according to Justice Breyer, had the effect of 
increasing spending to salve blighted neighborhoods from which Miami received 
diminishing tax revenue.125
The Court concluded that those types of harms gave Miami standing to sue as 
an “aggrieved person” sustaining injuries “within the zone of interests” from which 
the Fair Housing Act protects.126 Citing Gladstone, the Court explained that stare 
decisis compelled an expansive understanding of “aggrieved person,” to which 
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Congress acquiesced by leaving the definition of that term unaltered during the 1998 
amendment process.127
Although Miami had standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act, the Court 
rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s endorsement of foreseeability as sufficient to 
establish proximate cause, concluding that the city had to demonstrate a “direct 
relation” between its injuries and the alleged conduct.128 “[F]oreseeability alone 
does not ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires,” the Court 
explained, because “[t]he housing market is interconnected with economic and social 
life.”129 Enabling a lawsuit premised on any foreseeable result of predatory lending 
would, in the Court’s view, spur litigation beyond what Congress intended.130
Returning to common-law principles, the Court concluded that lawsuits under the 
Fair Housing Act require “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the 
injurious conduct alleged.”131 Declining “to draw the precise boundaries of 
proximate cause,” or whether Miami pleaded sufficient allegations, the Court then 
remanded the case for further consideration.132 Justice Breyer concluded by noting 
that a direct injury is typically not more than one step removed from the tortious act, 
which “depends in part on the nature of the statutory cause of action, and an 
assessment of what is administratively possible and convenient.”133
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, concurred in part and 
dissented in part, arguing that Miami’s injuries are both outside the Fair Housing 
Act’s zone of interests and “too remote to satisfy” the direct-relation requirement for 
causation.134 Justice Thomas criticized previous cases for using broad language 
inconsistent with the Fair Housing Act to expand the scope of permissible 
lawsuits.135 Foreclosed property and vacant lots, Justice Thomas continued, are not 
the same as racial steering and segregation.136 The dissent also faulted the majority 
for failing to address whether plumbers, utility companies, and other local-market 
participants have standing, taking solace in a holding that “should not be read to 
authorize suits by local businesses alleging the same injuries that Miami alleges 
here.”137 Justice Thomas concluded by agreeing that proximate cause requires a 
greater showing than foreseeability, but would have gone further to rule “Miami’s 
                                                                                                     
127 Id. at 1305 (“The upshot is that the City alleges economic injuries that arguably fall within the 
FHA’s zone of interests, as we have previously interpreted that statute.  Principles of stare decisis compel 
our adherence to those precedents in this context.  And principles of statutory interpretation require us to 
respect Congress’ decision to ratify those precedents when it reenacted the relevant statutory text.”). 
128 Id. (“The remaining question is one of causation: Did the Banks’ allegedly discriminatory lending 
practices proximately cause the City to lose property-tax revenue and spend more on municipal services?  
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the answer is ‘yes’ because the City plausibly alleged that its financial 
injuries were foreseeable results of the Banks’ misconduct.  We conclude that foreseeability alone is not 
sufficient to establish proximate cause under the FHA, and therefore vacate the judgment below.”).
129 Id. at 1306.  
130 Id.
131 Id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’rs Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).      
132 Id.
133 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
134 Id. at 1307 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135 Id. at 1308.  
136 Id. at 1308-09.  
137 Id. at 1311.  
78 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1
asserted injuries are too remote from the injurious conduct it has alleged.”138
Although Miami succeeded in arguing that it had standing to sue, enthusiasm 
was subdued over the prospect of success under a more exacting causation 
standard.139 Bank of America imposed “a tough test” for cities to satisfy, remarked 
Lyle Denniston.140 Tony Mauro suggested that the case “gives ammunition to both 
sides in litigation between cities and banks under the Fair Housing Act over the 
impact of predatory lending practices on local communities.”141 Professors Daniel 
Epps and Ian Samuel commented that, for a “big case,” the Court may have erred in 
its analysis of proximate cause because foreseeability is the “touchstone” of 
causation.142
Some suggested that Bank of America presages a shift in decision-making 
dynamics.  Steven Mazie mused at the idea of Chief Justice Roberts emerging as the 
new median justice, in view of Justice Kennedy’s rumored retirement.143 Professor 
Rick Hasen added that Chief Justice Roberts was “practicing” as the new swing 
vote.144 Brianne Gorod, chief counsel for the Constitutional Accountability Center, 
which filed an amicus brief on behalf of Miami, remarked that “[w]hile [Chief Justice 
Roberts] clearly remains a conservative Justice, today’s ruling is yet another 
reminder that he is a conservative who occasionally surprises.”145 Mark Joseph Stern 
cogitated about an “unexpected vote,” which “affirmed progressive cities’ role in 
combatting housing segregation in the United States.”146 He branded the vote by the 
Chief Justice as “a bit mysterious,” while illuminating that the decision “avoided a 
stalemate” among the eight justices who heard oral argument and limited Miami’s 
recourses going forward.147 Stern lamented that uncertainty in proving causation 
may lead cities to forego suing under Fair Housing Act, “deciding it isn’t worth 
devoting time, energy, and resources to a court battle that won’t even result in 
restitution.”148
The advocates continued their advocacy in the wake of the opinion.  Dean 
Erwin Chemerinsky was succinct: “The Supreme Court’s decision is an important 
victory for civil rights because it allows cities to sue to halt and remedy this racial 
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discrimination.”149 Victoria Mendez, Miami’s city attorney, said much the same: 
“We are pleased that the Supreme Court validated the city’s standing to bring its 
claims under the Fair Housing Act.”150 Robert Peck remained undaunted:  “As we 
told the Supreme Court, we can satisfy a direct causation standard, so that does not 
concern us.”151 Deepak Gupta (who represented several national organizations of 
cities, counties, and local elected officials in the case) called Justice Thomas’s 
argument a “typical sky-is-falling hyperbole,” effusing confidence in proving the 
allegations “on a block-by-block basis if necessary.”152 Representatives for the 
banks offered a different take:  
We believe that under the stringent standards articulated by the Supreme Court, it 
will be very difficult for Miami or any other municipality to show the required 
connection between the claimed damages and unsubstantiated allegations about our 
lending practices, which do not reflect how we operate in the communities we 
serve.153
The banks had previously observed that “[m]unicipal suits like this one were unheard 
of until recently, when enterprising contingency-fee counsel began pushing them,” 
adding with the benefit of Bank of America that the charges “are without merit.”154
The future remains unclear for these lawsuits and is largely dependent on the 
standards upon which courts eventually settle.  Yet advocates can influence these 
legal contours by articulating reasonable principles to govern proceedings.  Fealty to 
Bank of America is paramount, and patent law may provide an appropriate 
framework to craft discussions in this area.  
IV. HOW PATENT LAW CAN ASSIST COURTS IN ADJUDICATING CITY LAWSUITS 
UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Patent law is an oddity, as compared to other areas of the law.155 Patent litigation 
requires time and steady resources in part because dispositive issues are not apparent 
at the outset.156 Before and certainly after Bank of America, city lawsuits against 
lending institutions under the Fair Housing Act are no different.  Looking past 
superficial dissimilarities, proving that a physical object infringes on written claim 
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language is comparable to proving urban blight arose from discriminatory lending 
paperwork.  Patent law edifies litigation under Bank of America because it provides 
a case-management approach to technical evidentiary issues and imposes a strict 
standard for expert testimony before a jury can hear the case.  Fidelity to Bank of 
America requires robust case management, facilitating enough discovery to 
determine whether triable issues exist.                   
A.  Case-Management Plans for Patent Litigation as a Model Approach to Prove 
or Disprove Lawsuits under Bank of America
Patent cases follow a typical progression to trial (or dismissal).  The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas hosted 28% of all patent-infringement 
lawsuits in 2014, 43% in 2015, and 36% in 2016.157 That District Court’s approach 
to patent law and case management provides an exemplar for how to litigate Fair 
Housing Act claims brought by cities against banks.
Similar to patent cases, claims arising under Bank of America are not readily 
susceptible to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
because those claims require evidentiary rigor beyond the pleadings.158 At the 
pleadings stage, a city is required to demonstrate causation by alleging a direct 
relation between the alleged conduct of predatory lending and the economic harm
suffered.159 Cities must show harm within one step of the lending practices.160 As 
the Federal Circuit has observed, a patent-infringement complaint need only “contain 
sufficient factual allegations to enable this court to reasonably conclude that” the 
accused is plausibly liable.161 The alleged facts must create an impression guided by 
common sense that, if believed, discovery could prove liability.162 District courts 
have heeded this guidance, eschewing dismissal for failure to state a claim because 
of the need for greater factual development, disclosure and questioning of experts, 
and the avoidance of premature determinations.163 To address those issues at the 
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pleadings stage, would be “inappropriate” and circumscribe a party’s right to develop 
a case borne out over time on patent infringement, invalidity, and damages.164 The 
grant of a motion to dismiss in those complex cases requires “rare circumstances 
where facts [are] sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense.”165 As cities embark 
on proving that predatory lending practices cause economic losses and blight, 
plausible economic theories become concrete only through adversarial discovery and 
greater appreciation of the complex reasons why cities lose tax revenue and 
neighbors fall into dilapidation.     
Although the district court in Bank of America dismissed Miami’s complaint 
before discovery,166 requiring a hyper-burden of plausibility at the pleadings stage 
for these lawsuits finds no foothold in civil procedure and betrays the Seventh 
Amendment’s promise of a trial by jury.  Although civil procedure identifies certain 
causes of action that carry a higher pleading standard (e.g., fraud),167 nothing in the 
history of the Fair Housing Act suggests that plaintiffs should have to prove with 
certainty or state with particularity their case to survive dismissal.  The Supreme 
Court has ratcheted up the pleading standards writ large, as compared to erstwhile 
conceptions of notice pleading;168 but Bank of America did not engraft an atextual 
heightened burden of pleading to survive motions to dismiss beyond what the Court 
has already required in other cases.  Unlike other causes of action, no law requires 
cities to proffer evidence, make certifications, or affirmatively prove causation at the 
outset.169 Courts therefore should not prejudice these lawsuits when allegations of 
plausible facts exist.  These procedural safeguards build from the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases, which must be “jealously 
guarded.”170 Imposing inordinate obstacles at the pleading stage, while locking out 
discovery, is antithetical to this promise.171 The Seventh Amendment ensures an 
opportunity to prosecute a triable case consistent with extant civil procedure.172
                                                                                                     
to engage in a claim construction exercise . . . with no context whatsoever provided by discovery or a 
motion practice.”).  
164 See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-366-RGA-CJB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
176445, at *28-30 (D. Del. Dec. 5, 2012); see also Dumas v. Diageo PLC, No. 15cv1681 BTM(BLM), 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46691, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2016) (“However, there are ‘rare situations’ where 
it is appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based on review of the advertisement or product packaging 
itself.”).
165 Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp., No. 2:12cv592, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163943, at *10 (E.D. 
Va. Nov. 18, 2013).  
166 City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 13-24506-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 95445, at *15, *18 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2014).
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 9.
168 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
169 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of 
85th Legis.) (requiring a plaintiff to file a certificate of merit in any lawsuit for “damages arising out of 
the provision of professional services”).  
170 Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
171 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 
1101 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The court holds that if, after the close of discovery, the party requesting a jury 
cannot produce evidence supporting its claim to monetary damages, then the party no longer has a right 
to a jury.”).
172 See Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., 561 F.2d 494, 503-04 (4th Cir. 1977) (“The reason for this 
narrower range of discretion is that the sanction of a default judgment, though ‘a rational method of 
enforcement of the discovery rules,’ in an appropriate case, represents in effect ‘an infringement upon a 
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In addition to applying Bank of America consistent with other causes of action 
at the pleadings stage, a specialized scheduling order should govern these cases 
tailored to the unique discovery requirements of the parties.  In the Eastern District 
of Texas, the local rules for patent cases are set apart from local rules governing other 
civil cases.173 Although creating a formalistic set of rules for Bank of America cases 
is unnecessary because those cases are less frequent in number than patent cases,174
the idiosyncrasies of scheduling patent cases can assist courts and parties when 
litigating Fair Housing Act claims against predatory lending.  Among the relevant 
provisions, the Eastern District of Texas has default confidentiality rules to offset the 
absence of agreed upon protective orders.175 Doubtless banks and other lending 
institutions would like to avail themselves of those protections until parties can agree 
on a proposed protective order.  As part of the parties’ initial disclosures, the court 
also requires patentees to disclose their theories of patent infringement.176 A
corollary rule would enable banks soon after the filing of the complaint to understand 
a city’s theories beyond factual assertions.  These disclosures bridge the divide 
between the complaint and expert discovery.  
The local patent rules also provide for targeted document production and a 
formal pleading-amendment process after discovery closes.177 Sample docket-
control orders provide deadlines marching backward from jury selection, forcing 
parties to conform to established timelines for mediation, expert disclosures, fact 
discovery, expert reports, expert discovery, dispositive motions, pretrial filings, trial 
filings, and post-trial filings.178 Sample discovery orders force the parties to provide 
certain information as the case progresses, including a duty to supplement 
discovery.179
The upshot is an efficient case-management plan to bring the case to a fulcrum, 
either disposing of the claims quickly or providing a trial for which to prepare.  Bank 
of America cases require expert testimony and complex economic theories, and the 
Eastern District of Texas provides an approach to resolve disputes with deliberate 
speed.180
                                                                                                     
party's right to trial by jury under the seventh amendment’ and runs counter to ‘sound public policy of 
deciding cases on their merits,’ and against depriving a party of his ‘fair day in court.’” (internal footnotes 
and citations omitted)).
173 See Rules and Orders, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=rules-and-orders [https://perma.cc/3SZL-L72V].
174 See Stohr, supra note 64 (referencing the scarce number of cases filed by cities); see also Farmer, 
supra note 64.
175 E.D. Tex. P.R. 2-2. 
176 E.D. Tex. P.R. 3-1.
177 E.D. Tex. P.R. 3-2, 3-4, 3-6.
178 See Docket Control Order – Patent, District Judge Rodney Gilstrap, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=judge/district-judge-
rodney-gilstrap [https://perma.cc/HG5E-HAJQ].
179 See Discovery Order – Patent, District Judge Rodney Gilstrap, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=judge/district-judge-rodney-
gilstrap [https://perma.cc/A39S-87XL].
180 See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 63977, at *17-18 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017) (“The parties are directed to promptly meet and confer 
regarding the discovery needed by Allergan to oppose the inventorship defense.  The Court expects that 
the parties will be able to reach agreement on that issue.  However, in the event of a dispute, the Court 
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B.  Patent-Law Standards for Expert Witnesses as an Analogue to Discerning 
Competent Causation Experts in the Fair Housing Act Context
Discovery is indispensable to prove a case; an expert’s application of that 
discovery is indispensable to win a case.  Cases under Bank of America require time 
and necessitate discovery.  But providing time for discovery is beneficent only if the 
standards for expert testimony promote the presentation of competent evidence on 
proximate cause consistent with Bank of America.  Although not identical, the 
Federal Circuit’s approach to expert discovery may assist courts as they determine 
governing precepts in the wake of Bank of America.    
An unassailable tenet of summary judgment is that a jury is entitled to hear 
competent testimony from experts on their views of the evidence if those opinions 
generate a genuine dispute of material fact.181 Meretricious agreements fade, 
salutary arguments remain.  When qualified experts reach differing views on the 
same underlying facts, “a classic battle of the experts” arises, rendering summary 
judgment inapposite.182 Caselaw animates how experts on causation between 
economic harm and lending practices can reach a jury for a triable verdict.  
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court deputized 
trial judges as gatekeepers to glean admissible expert testimony, prescribing 
assessments of “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid,” and of “whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue.”183 Those assessments focus “on principles and 
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”184 Federal Rules of 
Evidence 702 and 703 assist trial courts in this determination.185 Under Rule 702, a 
witness may be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education,” and that expert may testify under the following circumstances:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.186
                                                                                                     
orders that the parties present the dispute to the Court no later than May 5, 2017.”); see also Fuentes v. 
City of Corpus Christi, No. 2:15-CV-327, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131840, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2016) 
(“The prejudice of allowing the amendment is that it will be detrimental to the efficient and timely 
resolution of the case.  Discovery has ended.  Dispositive motions have been filed.  The trial is less than 
a month away.  The proposed defendants would be entitled to answer, conduct discovery and file 
dispositive motions.  If granted, the proposed amendment would necessitate another continuance of the 
trial.  At this stage of the proceedings, with the trial less than a month away, on these facts, the undersigned 
finds Plaintiffs’ have not established good cause to amend to add defendants.”).
181 See generally MeadWestVaco Corp. v. Rexam Beauty & Closures, Inc., 731 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (“As discussed above, the XRD crystallinity limitation came down to a battle of the experts.”); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 56.    
182 See Edwards Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Digital Control Sys., 99 F. App’x 911, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
183 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 597 (1993).
184 Id. at 595.
185 See FED. R. EVID. 702-03.  
186 FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Rule 703 adds that “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that 
the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.”187
Daubert empowers a trial court to exclude an expert upon a showing of 
“unreliable principles or methods, legally insufficient facts and data, or where the 
reasoning or methodology is not sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.”188 Yet 
issues of credibility and truth are fact questions, not reasons for which to exclude.189
Daubert reminds that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”190
Experts on patent-infringement damages face a steep burden, and causation 
experts after Bank of America can learn from them.  To appraise the value of the 
patented invention, a patentee must show evidence “tending to separate or apportion 
. . . [its] damages between the patent feature and the unpatented features.”191 But if 
the patentee “can prove that the patented feature drives demand for the entire 
product,”192 that patentee can recover the entire market value of the product because 
the patented feature set the price point.193 A Fair Housing Act expert on causation, 
similarly, must isolate the various causes of decreased tax revenue and blight, 
assessing what act (if any) is within one step of the alleged harm.194 If economic 
statistics show that one act drove economic downturn, then a jury should be able to 
hear that testimony.  
The concept of apportionment in patent cases addresses concerns over 
“skew[ing] the damages horizon for the jury,”195 while isolating potential culprits of 
urban decay shores up the casual entity under the Fair Housing Act.  The net effect 
is the same:  distracting information is culled from the jury.  The process forces 
patent experts, for fear of exclusion, “to focus on reliable evidence of . . . the 
invention itself and to avoid potentially misleading forms of presentation of 
evidence.”196 A causation theory under the Fair Housing Act, likewise, “must be
based on ‘sound economic and factual predicates.’”197
Addressing what caused deterioration in Miami, as well as other blighted 
locations, adjures experts to opine on actual damages and, to paraphrase Federal 
Circuit precedent, “tie proof of [economic injury] to the [lending practices’] footprint 
in the marketplace.”198 Review of relevant-timeframe “market studies,” borrower 
“surveys,” admissions from lending institutions, regression analysis, and the like are 
                                                                                                     
187 FED. R. EVID. 703.
188 Summit 6, L.L.C. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
189 Id. (citation omitted).  
190 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
191 Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884). 
192 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
193 See id. at 67-68.
194 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017). 
195 LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 68 (quoting Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1319-20 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
196 Rembrandt Soc. Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 561 F. App’x 909, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
197 LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67 (quoting Riles v. Shell Exp. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2002)).
198 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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ineluctable.199 That the identity of true causes eludes certainty and is only 
occasionally gleaned through the passage of time should not stymie the causation 
analysis.200 That position, at best, is a counterpoise against causation.201 The law 
has never required certainty of proof, just that a party carry its burden before a trier 
of fact.  Hewing toward an articulable standard to discern causation enables that jury 
presentation.     
The work of experts “is not an exact science”202 Still applying certain principles 
should help courts in ferreting out proper evidence for a jury to consider.  Admissible 
expert testimony follows the Goldilocks principle:  if the testimony fits within the 
margins of relevant facts and legal competency, the jury should decide liability 
consistent with Bank of America.203
V. CONCLUSION
Bank of America is not cause for frabjous204 celebration among cities seeking to 
vindicate injuries accruing from predatory loans; nor is it a harbinger of freestyle 
immunity for lending institutions contributing to revitalized segregation.  Proving 
whether predatory lending practices cause urban blight is a fraught endeavor.  For 
various complicated reasons, even though Bank of America instituted standing for 
cities to sue under the Fair Housing Act for injuries from blight and property-tax 
degradation, understanding what caused those circumstances can be as confounding 
as comparing a patent’s claims to an article of manufacture to determine 
infringement.  Yet proof or disproof of predatory lending cannot be impossible, 
especially if a right exists to which a remedy attaches.205
Although vaticinations are less than sanguine for cities under the Court’s direct-
relation framework, patent law offers an approach to ascertain whether the harms are 
                                                                                                     
199 LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 69.
200 See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1556-
57 (2017) (“The causes of the crisis remain unclear.  It was popular at the time to blame the ‘epidemic’ of 
constitutional tort litigation fueled by proliferating plaintiffs’ attorneys and civil liberties groups.  Today, 
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by a mid 1980s change in taxation rules governing the reserves held by property casualty insurance 
companies.’”) (footnotes omitted).
201 See Marx v. Ebner, 180 U.S. 314, 319 (1901) (“It is seldom that such certainty of proof is 
possible.”); see also United States v. Barrera-Gonzales, 952 F.2d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 1992) (“It is rarely 
possible to prove anything to an absolute certainty.” (quoting United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 
(10th Cir. 1974))).
202 Summit 6, L.L.C. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
203 Judith Curry, The Goldilocks Principle, CLIMATE ETC. (Dec. 22, 2012), 
https://judithcurry.com/2012/12/22/the-goldilocks-principle/ [https://perma.cc/5DTU-SW83] (“The 
Goldilocks principle states that something must fall within certain margins, as opposed to reaching 
extremes.”).
204 I discovered the word “frabjous” while listening to a podcast in May 2017.  The Talking TED 
Talks Edition, SLATE MONEY, (May 6, 2017, 2:00 AM), 
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high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”).
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within one step of the alleged conduct.206 The fact-based inquiry of patent 
infringement is analogous to Fair Housing Act proximate cause insofar as both 
require discovery and experts to unearth whether an alleged act caused a legally 
cognizable harm.  Pleadings alone are insufficient to make these determinations, and 
enabling Rule 12(b)(6) as the primary vehicle to resolve cases is a solution unmoored 
from statutory text, circumscribing a city’s right to develop its case and present it to 
a jury.207 In addition, the demanding expert-testimony standards upon which patent 
law imposes can guide courts in determining which experts offer admissible accounts 
on causation.  District courts have readily available tools to dispose of unqualified 
experts unable to isolate the apparent causes of blight and decreased tax revenues.208
But when experts present dueling competent evidence on causation, nothing in a 
functioning adversarial system should prevent the issue of proximate causation from 
going to the jury.209
The Fair Housing Act did not endeavor to make unfair the ability to secure fair 
housing.  Fairness requires that, if an entity has standing to sue, the ability must exist 
to prove the case.  Shackling to a hobble prosecution to catalyze fair housing does 
violence to the legal system and perverts the appellation of “Equal Justice Under 
Law.”210 Bank of America enabled cities to sue under the Fair Housing Act, and, 
under the appropriate framework, cities can prove these cases if the evidence exists 
and is direct.  If it takes a village to raise a child,211 it also takes a city to protect its 
citizens from outside predation.  Fair housing is aspirational if the fight is not fair.  
Emboldened with evidence, cities play an integral role in the fight for fairness, both 
on the ground and in the courts.212
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